Abstract. We present a formal model of aspects of the haemodialysis machine case study using the Circus specification notation. We focus on building a model in which each of the software requirements (R-1-36) are represented by a Circus action. All of these act in concert with actions that model the collection of sensor data and the progress through the various therapy phases and activities. We then present how we model check the system using FDR.
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Introduction
This paper describes our experience in modelling the haemodialysis machine case study, that was issued for the ABZ 2016 conference [7] . We chose to do our modelling using Circus, a fusion of Z and CSP. We saw the case study as a way to assess how the ability to mix Z schemas with CSP-like processes would enable us to structure the model in a reasonably modular manner.
Our primary focus was on the software requirements (R-1 through R-36) and our plan was to use a Circus process or action to model the behaviour implied by each of them. We also modelled some support services, such as clocks and sensor reading actions, as well as the control-flow prescribed for the various phases of a typical therapy session.
We make reference to the case-study document [7] using the shorthand [HMCS] or [HMCS, part X]. We present a quick overview of Circus in §2. We then give an overview of the approach and present some of the modelling infrastructure in §3, before describing how some of the software requirements were modelled as processes in §4, where we also discuss how they were then assembled to give the full model. An issue with Circus is the availability of tool support, and so we discuss in §5 how we translated our model by hand into machine-readable CSP (CSPm), so that we could use the FDR3 refinement-checker [3] . We talk about issues and inconsistencies spotting during the modelling process in §6, and then, in §7, we conclude.
Woodcock and Cavalcanti developed Circus [12, 10] , as a formalism which not only combines Z [13] and CSP [6] , but also Dijkstra's guarded command language [2] . Its semantics is based on the Unifying Theories of Programming (UTP) [5] and it has a refinement calculus, developed by Oliveira [9] based on that of Morgan [8] . The thesis by Oliveria [9] is also the de-facto reference for Circus 2 . A Circus script can be considered as a series of "paragraphs", which can be either Z paragraphs or CSP process definitions, or a hybrid mix of CSP with "commands" to produce actions. The key feature here is that Circus uses Zschemas to declare variables and state invariants, and then allows CSP actions to refer to and modify those variables.
We shall present a simplified version of Circus here, focussing on those CSP aspects as used in this paper. We shall simply model state-changing operations by variable assignment, as proxy for the Z schema parts. In the rest of the paper we make use of proper Z schemas.
For both CSP and Circus, a typical description consists of a series of definitions of the form
where N is a (process/action) name, the v i are local parameters, and C is a process/action "construct" that may or may not refer to N and the v i .
Basic building blocks include expressions over local state, and ways to describe events:
N ∈ Name -Process Names k ∈ Const -Concrete Values v ∈ Var -Local Variables e ∈ Expr -Expressions over Local State a ∈ Event -Atomic Events c ∈ Chan -Event Channel c.k ∈ Event -Channel Data Event Events are observable, atomic (they either happen "in full" or not at all) but can be composite objects. So a common idiom is to describe events -atomic ! -of the form c.k which is to be interpreted as the atomic event consisting of the transfer of a value k along a channel c. A process is an entity that is willing to perform some events, but not others, depending on its current state. We consider all processes as interacting with an environment, also considered as a process. A process willing to perform an event can be said to be "offering" that event.
Whether or not the event actually occurs depends on both the willingness of the environment to perform it, and the synchronisation requirements between the process and its environment.
We shall first consider those constructs of Circus that are essentially the same as their CSP counterparts:
Briefly, Skip terminates immediately; Prefix a −→ C performs event a and then behaves like C ; Input c?v −→ C performs a channel event c.k where k is a valid value for local variable v , and then behaves like C [k /v ]; and Output c!e −→ C performs event c.k , where k is the current valuation of e, and then behaves like C . We also have sequential composition where C 1 ; C 2 behaves first like C 1 and then behaves like C 2 . Another composition form is parallel, in which C 1 cs C 2 runs both commands in parallel, synchronising on events in cs and interleaving others. External choice (C 1 C 2 ) allows the environment to choose between the events offered by C 1 and C 2 , so determining which runs. The guarded command e & C behaves like C if e evaluates to true, otherwise behaves like the canonical deadlocked process Stop, which is a unit for external choice.
Now we look at those constructs which have been added to CSP to produce Circus, as well as CSP constructs that require modification in order to "play nice" with the extended semantics.
We have assignment v := e , that updates a variable that can be local or global. We also have guarded commands (if . . . fi) in the "Dijkstra Style" [2] , where a single guarded command is denoted by e −→C , e being a boolean-valued expression. The strong similarity between event prefix (a −→C ) and guarded command (e −→ C ) is unfortunate, but is part of the official Circus syntax [9] . However, it has the same semantics as guarded processes, so, for clarity's sake, we shall use e & C in the sequel for both, to avoid confusion with prefixing.
For Circus we need a slightly more complicated notion of parallel composition because we have global state. In order to put C 1 and C 2 (say) in parallel, we require that the sets of variables modified by the two commands be disjoint, otherwise the parallel composition is not well-formed. We write C 1 ||[ us | cs | vs ]|| C 2 to indicate that the variables modified by C 1 are contained in us, and those modified by C 2 are in vs, with us ∩ vs = ∅. As with CSP parallel, we also specify the events/channels (cs) on which both sides must synchronise. In addition, when the parallel composition starts, each side gets its own snapshot of the starting variable state, which it then subsequently uses to record its own variable updates. While either of C 1 or C 2 are still running, the state changes made by one are not visible to the other. At the end, once both have terminated, then their snapshots are merged to give the overall final state. This means that if C 1 wants to communicate a state change to C 2 , while both are still running, then it must use input/output events to achieve this.
One key advantage that Circus has over CSP is its ease of handling a large collection of named state components, when most situations only require the update of a few of those components. For example, imaging a process FIRST that waits for an event e and then increments a state component called s, which is one among a large number of such components, and then behaves like NEXT . The CSP definition of FIRST and NEXT would be something like the following:
The Circus equivalent would be 
Approach
In order to formalise the HD machine [4] , a few decisions were made regarding the system environment, sensors and the kind of responses that are required. In this section, we present our decisions about how we deal with timing, the overall structure of the HD machine, as well as how we capture the sensing functionality, and how the system should respond to events according to the requirements.
Timing Properties
A first consideration we need to take into account is how we handle time, as there are several safety requirements for the machine that deal with time. For example, the software requirement R-2 deals with the absence of blood flow in the machine for a period of 120 seconds. After that period is over, the machine should respond right away by stopping the blood flow and raising an alarm.
We did not feel that the timing issues in the specification warranted the complexities of using a timed variant of Circus. Also, the precise times are not that important for our model -rather than waiting for a model time to elapse corresponding to 120 seconds, we would simply treat It more symbolically. All we really need to be able to distinguish is between a time when haven't reached such a limit, and that limit time.
We defined a Circus process called SysClock that starts with the ResetClock process that initialises the time variable and then calls Clock . On its turn, Clock repeatedly issues tick events, and increments a state component called time, storing the current time. The current SysClock time is made available through the channel getCurrentTime.
Another feature we need to have in our model is a wait period in order to comply with requirements such as R-16 that specifies a period of time between two phases of the therapy. We therefore define a Circus process Wait that counts n tick cycles. The variable n is decremented after each tick and the entire process ends when the value of n reaches zero, here defined as a Skip action.
State Components
The notion of machine state is essential in order to record key values of the various components of the system. Reading the software requirements section led us to identify over 20 state components used during the execution of the system. These are related to sensor measurements, sensor limits and switches that allows the physician to adjust the parameters for the therapy. We also take into account some components that we decided to include in our specification as state components. These are used, for example, to register the activity and therapy phases of the HD machine. We also create records of the time in the system.
In our model, we define the Z schema HDGenComp, composed of the state components that we identified whilst reading the system requirements. For instance, we identify the airVol and airVolLimit parameters from R-28-32, as detailed in Section 4.
HDGenComp airVolLimit : Z; airVol : Z; alarm : SWITCH ; . . . describing with the description of many components of the system. For instance, [HMCS, Table 2 ] describes the rinsing parameters that are defined and entered into the machine during therapy. These parameters have specific ranges of values. We model the content of Table 2 as the RinsingParameters schema with its components. Moreover, we define the value ranges of the components as state invariants. For example, the range for the Filling BP rate is 0 − 6000mL and is modelled in Z as the state variable fillingBPRate, with an invariant of fillingBPRate ∈ { x : Z • 0 ≤ x ≤ 6000}. The overall state component RinsingParameters is illustrated below.
RinsingParameters fillingBPRate : Z; rinsingBPRate : Z; . . .
The entire state of the HD machine is modelled as the schema HDState, which is composed by the above described HDGenComp schema, along with the RinsingParameters and all the other schemas, DFParameters, such as UFParameters, PressureParameters, and HeparinParameters, modelling the variables detailed in the [HMCS, .
We also initialise the HDGenComp components modelled as the HDGenCompInit schema that basically sets the numerical values to zero, along with switching off the alarm and closing sensors and tubes.
As part of our HD machine model, we want to detect the values from the various sensors in the system and update these into the state components described above. In order to achieve that task, we define the Circus process SensorReadings that watches a number of Circus channels each of them responsible for sensing a specific value arising from the machine sensors. These values are then stored in the state components, as described by HDGenComp.
In addition, this process also makes the current recorded readings available
The process SensorReadings is basically a large external choice over all sensor readings and reading reports, that repeats endlessly. This approach is fine for sensor readings for which the time at which they occur is not important and so we are happy for an interested process to poll the relevant state component at regular intervals. Some sensor readings require some form of timestamping with possible timeouts, and some of these are handled separately, as explained later.
In order to capture the transition between the therapy phases of the HD machine, we provide a Circus process called StatePhase, that changes the value of the state variable hdMachineState depending on signals received during the therapy. Basically, when the process for a specific therapy phase begins, it immediately uses a special event to announce its commencement. Process StatePhase monitors these and updates state variables accordingly. For example after a signal preparationPhase, produced by the Circus process TherapyPreparation, the state variable hdMachineState is changed to prepPhase and will be used by the software requirements as described in the Section 4.
Response to the requirements
Whilst modelling the software requirements, we were able to identify twelve different kinds of behaviours that are expected among the 36 listed requirements. For each of them, we needed to provide an action that is equivalent to the intended behaviour of the requirement. For example, the expected behaviour for the requirement R-1 to be satisfied is to stop the blood flow and raise an alarm. We formalise those two responses as Z schemas StopBloodFlow and RaiseAlarm: the former produces a signal stopBloodFlow stopping the current flow and the latter sets the alarm to ENABLED and then triggers the buzzer of the system.
This two process capture a common behaviour when a requirement error condition arises.
Model Development
In this section we give details of the modelling that resulted from our chosen approach: namely to model each of the safety requirements R-1 to R-36 as a Circus Action that "enforces" that requirement. It allows us to show how the sensors are integrated into our model and how the system should behave accordingly. We then present an overview of the therapy phases of the machine, describing how we structure our model with respect to the activities performed.
Software Requirements
A first example of how we model the requirement is illustrated by the requirement R-1. According to the description, during the application of arterial bolus, the system monitors the volume of saline infusion and if the volume exceeds 400ml, the system should stop the blood flow and raise an alarm signal.
PreR1
∆ HDState hdActivity ∈ {applicationArterialBolus} ∧ infSalineVol > 400
We define a schema PreR1 for the alarm-state precondition, and if it is satisfied, the system will perform StopBloodFlow and RaiseAlarm. If the precondition is not satisfied (¬ PreR1), it waits for a defined period of time (parameter CheckInterval ) and checks again. This illustrates the general approach here for many of these monitoring requirements. They check state variables at regular intervals and raise alarms if required. This decouples them from the process of doing sensor readings and recording the results.
The second software requirement, R-2, monitors the blood flow and in the event that no flow is detected for a period longer than 120 seconds, the system should raise an alarm and stop. We formalise the requirement with help of two interleaved processes, NoFlowWatchDog and BloodFlowSample.
R2 = NoFlowWatchDog BloodFlowSample
The former process monitors the time interval during which no blood flow occurs. if this exceeds the timeout, then the system will stop the blood pump StopBP and RaiseAlarm. This is an example of a sensor reading that is not handled by SensorReadings, because it needs to record a timestamp for the most recent non-zero reading. Requirement R-9 is an example of how we create helper processes in order to capture the intended behaviour of the system. During the phase connecting the patient, the machine should monitor the pressure at the VP transducer and if the value measured exceeds 450mmHg for more than 3 seconds, the machine should respond by stopping the blood pump and raising an alarm signal.
In our model, we first create a helper process TrackTimervpTransdPressR9 that monitors such pressure values through the channel senvpTransdPress, after one tick event and updates the timer interval with the following condition: when the sensed VP transducer pressure is higher than 450, the timer interval is incremented; otherwise, the timer is reset until the condition is satisfied again.
The next step is to define a Z schema PreR9, in which we define the alarm precondition for the requirement itself. The requirement is specified for use during the initiation phase and is satisfied if the value of vpTransdPress is higher than 450 for a period of 3 seconds, captured by the timerIntervalR9 state variable with a value higher than 3000 ms.
PreR9 ∆HDState
hdMachineState ∈ {connectThePatient} vpTransdPress > 450 ∧ timerIntervalR9 > 3000
Should the precondition of the R-9 requirement be satisfied, the system does StopBP and RaiseAlarm. Otherwise, it waits for a predefined time interval before checking again.
During the connecting the patient phase, R-16 specifies a time interval of 310 seconds for that phase. When the specified time ends, the machine should change to the initiation phase. We formalise that requirement through a signal conToPatient, followed by a wait period of 310000 ticks, and ended with a signal therapyInit that is triggered at the beginning of that phase.
Therapy Processes
We now describe how we model the therapy phases of the HD machine-the top level "workflow", so to speak. According to the requirements, the system starts with the preparation phase, followed by the initiation phase, and an ending phase:
MainTherapy = TherapyPreparation ; TherapyInitiation ; TherapyEnding
The initiation phase also contains the "perform therapy" phase for some reason that is unclear to us 3 . Each of these phases is further broken down. For the therapy preparation phase, we define a Circus process that starts with a signal preparationPhase, followed by a sequence of activities according to [HMCS, §3.2]. A key idea here is each phase signals that it has started, on a channel, so that requirements and activities that are phase-dependent can ascertain when they should be active.
We capture the steps that compose the therapy preparation phase, each one, with a Circus process that behaves accordingly. 
Putting it all together
We conclude this section by detailing how we put all the pieces together. We start the main process of the HD machine, the HDMachine process, with the schema HDGenCompInit that initialises the state variables of the system. Then, the system is modelled as a parallelism between the MainTherapy process and the SoftwareRequirements process.
A second parallelism is required between the above and the StatePhase Circus process. The latter is a process that watches the changes of state, through signals like preparationPhase and therapyInitiation, and after these, the state variable hdMachineState are set accordingly, in order to be used by the requirements defined for the SoftwareRequirements process. Then the components are put in parallel with the SensorReadings process, used for example, to update the values of the state components.
Finally, the entire system is put in parallel with the SysClock process, synchronising on the channels tick and getCurrentTime, denoting the time elapsed, and the output of the time value for the rest of the therapy, respectively.
HDMachine {| tock , getCurrentTime | } SysClock
Checking the Model
Currently, there is limited tool support for Circus, and nothing that can be used for direct model-checking of machine-readable Circus. Limited support can found as part of the Community Z Tools (CZT) project [1] , as extensions to the Z support there. This is facilitated by the way that the machine-readable syntax of Circus takes the form of L A T E X documents in that same way as that of Z.
We were able to use the Circus extension to CZT, which include a parser and type-checker to assess our model. After minor revisions correcting typos and small type errors, we obtained a model that satisfied both the parser and type-checker.
The current approach to model-checking Circus is to translate it into machinereadable CSP (CSP M ), and use FDR3 [3] to do the model checking. Unfortunately, there is no automated way to do this, so such translations have to be done by hand. Fully-, or even semi-, automatic translation from Circus to CPSm is difficult, but is an active research topic. FDR3 itself is described as a refinement checker, which basically means is that it is a model checker, where the models are labelled transition systems derived from the operational semantics of CSP, and the properties to be checked are assertions about the existence of a refinement relation between two distinct models, one for the specification, the other for the implementation.
Manual Translation We manually translated our Circus specification into CSP M , in order to do some basic checks, particularly regarding deadlock freedom. Here we give a brief description of the translation and the challenges we encountered, most notably that of avoiding state-space explosion.
For most of the Circus constructs, we have a pretty straightforward translation into CSP M , as we know that Circus is derived from CSP. For example, a lot of the type and channel declarations are very simple, so the following Circus fragment: 
Translation of Circus processes containing state
In Circus, when we want to manipulate the values of a component of a state component, we can freely access it, even as an assignment, as it is within the context of the Circus process. However that is not possible in CSP M .
We need to adopt a different approach for the translation. Basically we concert each state schema into a CSP process that has get and set events for each state component, so that, for example, the Circus action All the actions accessing global state would run in parallel synchronising on the relevant get and set events.
Checking of the model using FDR
We checked our CSP M model of the HD Machine using FDR3, with assertions regarding deadlock and livelock freedom. These helped us re-factor our model, mainly to avoid deadlocks that occurred because of errors in specifying synchronisation events. As a result of this we are very confident that our Circus model is deadlock-free.
A big issue we had to deal with was the fact that our original Circus model had a huge state-space: we had a clock that ticked every millisecond, together with a timeout in one of the requirements of 310 seconds. We also had checks for values in large numeric ranges, typically for fluid volumes. We had to carefully decide how to shrink the state-space by reducing the range of values as low as possible without having an impact on the integrity of the model.
Fortunately, most of the uses for numbers are to specify limits outside of which special action needs to be taken. Also, in many cases the number values are specific to just one requirement or a small coherent group. This makes is easy to shrink the range of values for one such requirement without worrying about its effect on another.
For example, R-20-21 talks about measures that span the range of normal human body temperature, but are only explicit about two boundaries, one at 33
• C , the other at 41
• C . Error conditions arise if the temperature outside those bounds. This defines three regions of interest, but we do not need to model temperature values in the range 32 . . . 42 (say), but simply have three values that denote: "too cold", "too hot" and "just right".
We were able to check small clusters of requirement processes against the full machine model, and show their interaction was deadlock free. Even running the tests on a virtual machine cluster with 16 cores and 32GB of RAM we found that we handle at most about 3 requirements at a time. However as they are all independent, it didn't prevent us form checking them all.
Further ways to attempt overcome the state-space problem are described by Roscoe et al. [11] , suggesting the use of compression techniques in order to model-check larger CSP specifications in FDR, allowing the reduction of both the number of states and the transitions to be visited. We will explore this as part of future work.
Back-annotation
Where analysis with FDR3 exposed any structural issues, we modified the Circus version, as would be expected. However we have not, at this stage, made the changes to number ranges needed to make model-checking feasible. Simply put, since there are no model-checkers for Circus, or automated translation to any other modelling notation such as CSP M , we felt that we would keep the "full story" in the model. Clearly this would need to be addressed should automatic checking become possible.
One of the often-touted advantages of building formal models is that the rigour, level of detail and completeness that they require, results in the exposure of a lot of ambiguities and incompletenesses in the informal requirements and specifications. Here we collect a number of such issues that arose as part of our rigorous, detailed analysis of the case study.
We did look at the safety requirements and future work will look at formalising those with a view of being able to check the requirements model against the safety one. We shall start with a few observations regarding safety:
-S-4 talks about draining saline solution to a bag/bucket attached to the venous connector. Presumably this means the patient isn't connected here. But this is when the patient is connected to EBC, and S-1 requires both arterial and venous connectors are connected simultaneously. -S-5 makes a very ambiguous use of the phrase "can be connected". This can refer to a state, of being connected (up) to something or to a process, that involves making the connection with something (which will of course result in being in the state of being connected). We believe that what S-5 intended to state was that the process (connecting to) could only occur during initiation, but that the state (now connected to) would continue to hold during the main therapy portion. -S-7 talks about power-loss. We are given no information about how the machine might cope, or the hardware's power-down state. How might an alarm be raised without power? Also, surely S-7 should be about blood flow stopping for any reason, not just power failure? -S-9 talks about the difference between actual and measured blood flow, mentioning low or negative AP as an issue. Is there a well-defined relationship linking actual flow to measured flow and AP?
Next, issues that arose while looking at requirements and activities:
-State Components: We identified a bunch of parameters and sensors that are described in the software requirements section. Some of these are not mentioned elsewhere in the entire text and therefore we do not know what the restrictions are regarding expected values for them. We modelled these items based on our limited understanding, defining types for each of them. These are modelled as components of the HDGenComp schema, as part of the HDState. For instance, the pressure at the VP transducer and AP transducer are modelled as vpTransdPress and apTransdPress respectively. -Alarm: In several requirements, the expected behaviour of the system is to raise an alarm. However, we don't know precisely what is the overall behaviour of the system for most of these requirements. Once the alarm is raised, what is the expected behaviour of the system? Does the system stop entirely until the alarm is acknowledged, or are some functions not available? -R-35 is not formalised in our current version of the HD machine model.
There seems to be a safety issue in this requirement. The system "shall monitor the net fluid removal volume and if the net fluid removal volume exceeds (UF set volume + 200 mL)", the machine goes into bypass and the alarm is raised. However, once the alarm is acknowledged by the user, the requirement says that "the software shall increase the UF set volume by 200 mL". Is it really the intention to set a limit monitored by an alarm where the response mandate for the user is to raise the limit to the level were the alarm signal is (just) disabled?
Conclusions
We started this Circus case-study as a response to the HD machine case study, proposed for the ABZ 2016 conference [7] . We summarise our approach thus: we capture the communication between the sensors and the system and also define a structure for the data used around the system; we make use of Z schemas in order to define the model state and also operations that change that state, all related to the various sensor readings and parameters defined for the therapy.
We have around a thousand lines of Circus specification for the model, with about sixty state variables and forty events, and we have around ninety processes/actions used for modelling the requirements and the overall therapy procedures. We found that the ability to read and write small state components by name (using small Z schemas and assignment) coupled with the usual ability to structure CSP as small parallel processes made it easy to restrict any formal text to only parts of the system that were immediately relevant.
In our investigation, we were able to model almost all the software requirements with exception of R-35 whose description leads us to see a contradiction that may be a safety issue, as discussed in Section 6.
Due to the current lack of tool support for direct checking of Circus specifications, we needed to translate our model, by hand, into CSP in order to be able to perform model checking using FDR3 [3] . In our translation, we had to adapt the Circus model for CSP M because Circus programs has explicit state-based features (such as assignment), which are not present in CSP M , which instead relies on process parameter-lists to handle state. The equivalent specification written in CSP M has around 24 hundred lines, more than twice the size of the Circus version, due to the inclusion of auxiliary functions and new channels for communicating with the new state-modelling processes. We were able to perform model checking using FD3R and perform checks that the requirements could run in parallel with the therapy model, synchronising on common events, without any deadlocks.
For future work, we intend to build the corresponding model of the safety requirements, and link it to the requirements model in order to look for inconsistencies. Other possible avenues of investigation would include deriving a formal software specification structured around the architecture and functional decomposition of a realistic implementation design. We would expect this to be structured differently to the model we have just derived from the requirements, and it would raise interesting issues regarding their refinement relation and verification.
Another interesting piece of future work would be to derive software prototypes from our Circus model to allow us to simulate the system execution. In the long term, we have interest in working with theorem proving for the refinement of Circus programs and possible proofs of test-cases. It is also in our plans to explore the development of tools that allows us to perform model-checking directly with Circus programs.
